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m THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
XT 
V . 
GLEN RAY BULLOCK, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Priority No. 2 
Case No. 960119-CA 
NATURE OF APPEAL AND JURISDICTIONAL BASIS 
Defendant appeals from his conviction for assault by a prisoner, a third-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1995). He claims 
insufficient evidence to support the trial court's guilty verdict. Brief of 
Defendant at 1. This Court has jurisdiction over appeals from third-degree 
felony convictions. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When the evidence showed that defendant and the victim were in a 
"heated" confrontation seconds before the assault and that defendant admitted the 
assault to a deputy sheriff, was the trial court's guilty verdict supported by the 
evidence? This Court will not reverse a bench trial verdict of guilt unless the 
defendant establishes that the verdict is clearly erroneous, i.e., against the "clear 
weight of the evidence." State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); City 
ofOrem v. Lee, 846 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah App. 1993). 
RELEVANT PROVISIONS 
Any provisions relevant to this appeal are included in the text. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History 
The trial court convicted defendant of assault by a prisoner, a third-degree 
felony (R. 164). 
Statement of Facts 
Defendant and Ron Neil Tischner were inmates at the Tooele County Jail 
(R. 108, 157). One night, after Mr. Tischner had confronted two other inmates 
about putting shaving cream on his neck, defendant came up and admitted doing 
it (R. 108,142). After heatedly discussing the incident, Mr. Tischner turned 
away from defendant and walked into his cell (R. 109). When he walked into his 
cell, someone hit him in the back of the neck, causing him to fall on his bunk and 
split open his eye (id.). When he looked around to see who had hit him, no one 
was there (id.). According to Kevin Reeder, defendant followed Tischner to the 
jail cell door: "he never quite went into the room, he reared back, he turned 
around, he~I quote, he says, 'Don't f— with me" (R. 133). 
2 
Later that night, after collecting some statements from witnesses, Deputy 
Sheriff Joe Walker, shift supervisor at the jail, received a call over his intercom 
from an inmate, whose voice he recognized as defendant's (R. 121). Defendant 
told Deputy Walker that he wanted to give his side of the story, i.e., that he had 
"struck Mr. Tischner but it was in self-defense" (R. 121).! 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence supports the trial court's verdict that defendant hit the victim. 
The trial court based its verdict on defendant's admission that he and the victim 
argued seconds before the hit and that defendant later admitted the crime to a 
jailer. Defendant's appellate challenge to sufficiency only re-interprets the 
evidence before the Court. It fails to show that the evidence or reasonable 
inferences from the evidence were unreasonable. 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DREW REASONABLE 
INFERENCES FROM THE EVIDENCE, ITS FINDING OF 
GUILT SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
Defendant claims that the verdict is against the clear weight of the 
evidence. To support this assertion, defendant draws competing inferences from 
At trial, defendant denied making this statement to Deputy Walker (R. 147). 
3 
the evidence before the trial court and challenges the credibility of the State's 
witness, Deputy Walker. Brief of Defendant at 6-8. 
Because this Court respects the trial court's ability to draw its own 
inferences and judge credibility of witnesses before it, however, defendant's 
challenge must fail. Cf. State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 693 (Utah App. 1995) 
(jury verdict may be based on evidence as well as "reasonable inferences fairly to 
be deduced therefrom); see Smith v. State, 895 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex.Ct.App. 
1995) ("In a bench trial, the judge ... may draw reasonable inferences and make 
reasonable deductions from the evidence.").2 
Defendant takes the three pieces of evidence offered at trial, draws 
different inferences from them than the trial court, and then subjects each 
inference to a sufficiency review. Brief of Defendant at 6-8. First, he alleges 
that Mr. Tischner's testimony "must create reasonable doubt" because he did not 
see the defendant strike the blow. Id. at 6. Second, he asserts that Deputy 
2
 In State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated that the standard of review for a bench trial differs from that for a jury trial. A bench 
trial verdict is a finding of fact under rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and is subject 
to the clearly erroneous review standard. Nevertheless, this type of review does not limit the 
trial court's ability to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. This power comes from 
the clearly erroneous standard itself, which requires that a party challenging a finding 
"demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient." State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996) (emphasis added). 
4 
Walker's statement that defendant admitted the crime was incredible because the 
deputy could not recall in which cell defendant was housed. Id. at 7. Finally, he 
interprets Kevin Reeder's testimony that he saw defendant "rear back" at the 
door of defendant's cell as evidence that defendant was trying to avoid being 
struck. Id. at 9. 
Though these inferences may be logical, defendant's argument 
misapprehends that this Court does not give equal footing to competing 
inferences. Rather, unless a defendant shows that the trial court's inferences 
lacked evidentiary support or reason, this Court accepts them. Blubaugh, 904 
P.2d at 693. Appellate courts give similar deference to factfinder decisions about 
witness credibility. State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) 
(credibility can be reweighed only in unusual circumstances). 
Defendant does not establish that the trial court's inferences are 
unreasonable or that unusual circumstances mandate a reweighing of credibility. 
Based on the guilty verdict, the trial court evidently believed the State's 
interpretation of defendant's "rearing back," i.e., that it described a movement 
much like a baseball pitcher's windup (R. 158). Similarly, the trial court 
evidently discounted Deputy Walker's confusion about the cell numbers, and 
reasonably found it did not undermine his testimony. The trial court specifically 
5 
stated that it was the deputy's recollection of defendant's voice over the intercom 
that was the critical factor (R. 163). 
Defendant also misinterprets the sufficiency review process. He separately 
analyzes each piece of evidence to see whether that evidence, standing alone, 
established guilt. This method ignores the important axiom that sometimes the 
whole equals more than the sum of its parts. A trial court, as well as a jury, 
views the evidence in its totality. Tischner's testimony alone might not establish 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.3 However, the trial court did not 
just look at Tischner's testimony; it evaluated Tischner's testimony in light of 
Reeder's and Walker's.4 Looked at cumulatively, the evidence provided 
sufficient basis for the court's inference that defendant hit Tischner and, 
therefore, committed the crime. 
3
 This is not to say, however, that Tischner's testimony, in defendant's words, 
acreate[d] reasonable doubt." Brief of Defendant at 6. 
4
 The trial court's perception of defendant, and his answers on the stand, might 
also have played a role in the multifactorial analysis of guilt or innocence. 
6 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS U2?vday of November 1996. 
JAN GRAHAM 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAMES H. BEADLES 
Assistant Attorney General 
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